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GIFTS IN VIEW OF DEATH.
THE donatio morti8 causa is one of those perplexed topics in the
law which are at once the despair of judges, and the delight of
law'schools. On either side of most of the questions which may
arise within its fortunately narrow range, cases could be found to
support an argument which might embarrass if it did not convince.
Its very definition, indeed, and the fundamental idea which it
involves, are still, after a century of discussion, quite unsettled.
Thus in England the inference appears to be, that in such a gift,
the title does not vest till the death of the donor, when if necessary,
a trust will arise in the executor;' while in Pennsylvania, and
other of the United States, it has been held to be essential that
the property should pass at once.2  That is to say, by the one, the
donatio mnorti8 cau sa is treated merely as a conditional gift; in the
other, it is considered as an exceptional species of testamentary
disposition.
I Dufleld v. Biwees, 1 Bligh, N. S. 643; Edwards v. Jones, 1 My. & Cr., 235;
See Brown v. Brown, 18 Conn., 414.
2 Nicholas v. Adams, 2 Whart. 17; Craig v. Craig; 3 Barb. Ch. 116; Harris v.
Clark, 8 Comet. 121; Penny v. Gitting, 2 Gill & J. 209; Jones v. Dyer, 16 Ala. 225;
McDowell v. Murdock, 1 Nott & McCord, 287.
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In this state of the law, the report which we give in another
part of this journal, of a very recent case in the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania,' cannot fail to prove acceptable to our readers,
both from the importance of the point involved, and the clearness
with which the questions, of which we have spokeny are treitted.
It is unnecessary to refer here with particularity to the facts of
the case; -it is enough to say that rejecting the inferences which
the general course of decision might seem to justify, as founded on
exceptions not to be extended by analogy, the court rule that a
gift mortis causa of all the donor's property, 'though that be actu-
ally present, is invalid as within both spirit and letter of the Wills
Act. To decide otherwise, indeed, as was said, would be to repeal
its provisions.
It is not, however, so much to the actual question in controversy,
that we would now call attention as to some general observations
of Judge Lowrie, in delivering the opinion in the case, on the in-
fluence and authority of the civil law upon the subject. That law,
to which the donatio morti8 cauea unquestionably owes its origin,
has been so constantly looked to in its development, and invoked
for the elucidation of new points as they arose, that the assertion
of the learned judge that "the rules of the Roman lawyers are no
guide to us" in the determination of a question of this nature,
might seem at first sight almost a paradox. But a careful cousul-
tation of the writers on Roman Jurisprudence, will convince the
inquirer of the general justness of Judge Lowrie's views, and force
him to the conclusion that, 'iept.with the gieatest caution, and
in rare cases, he cannot look with safety beyond. the limits of his
own books, for the principles which he must adopt. Suchi at least,
has been the result of our own investigations, which, as the English
authors in treating of the subject seem to have somewhat misap-
prehended the passages in the civil law, which they cite,2 we shall
proceed briefly to detail, hoping that the unpractical character of
1Headley v. Kirby, post.
2 For instance, Mr. Williams, in his Treatise on Executors, p. 650; Mr. Roper on
Legaciesrpage 7. So also Lord Hardwicke in Ward v. Tamer, 2 Ves. 436.
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our remarks may be compensated for by the importance of the
point on which they bear.'
As the donatio mortis causa, is, in one point of view, only a
species under the general head of gift, it will be proper to begin
with a glance at the nature and limitations of the latter in the
Roman law. And as nothing was a greater characteristic of the
prudent citizens of the Republic than the care with which in earlier
times, they guarded against fraud and prodigality, it is necessary
to consider first the formalities required to constitute a valid
donation. With regard to these a variety of legislative provisions
appear to have existed from time to time. A lex Cornelia, is the
first which is mentioned on the subject, a fragment of which, pre-
served in Ulpian, prohibits any one from becoming surety for
another for more than a sum amounting to about $800 in each
year.2  This was followed by the lex Cincia, passed about B. C.
200, whose objects and purpose have been a fruitful source of dis-
cission amongst the foreign jurists, Savigny having made it the
subject of an elaborate essay.3  The better opinion seems to be
that a sum was established, above which certain formalities were
required in order to make a gift binding ;4 though others consider
the law to have prohibited donations beyond the amount fixed,
except to near relatives, and to have prescribed the forms for those
below it.5 Whichever be right, it is dertain that the gift of cor-
poreal property, must have been in one of three ways; by mancipa-
I In the succeeding remarks'the writer has followed Mackeldey, (Lehrbuch, trans.
Brussels, 1846,) Mullenbruch, (Doctrina Pandectarum,) Hugo, )Histoire de Droit,
Ron.,) and Savigny, (Hist. Rom. Law, by Cathcar, and system des heut. Rom.
Rechts. vol. IV.) who are at present the standard authorities on the Continent.
2 Hugo, p. 172.
3 Ueber die lex Cincia, Zeitschr. Vol. IV. It is from this law that the rule in
England which precludes the barristerfrom maintaining suit for his fees, isremotely
derived. See Tacitus Ann. XL 5. N'e guis ob causam orandam pecuniam donumve
accipiet. As this statute was aimed against fraud and extravagance, Blackstone's con-
clusions from it (3 Comm. 28) as to the honorable character of the Roman advocacy
appear to be as unfounded with regard to earlier, as they are unquestionably untrue
as to later times.
4 Savigny system, voL IV. 144, 155. 5 Mackeldey, 468.
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tion, to which the presence of seven Roman citizens was necessary;
by the in jwre cessio, a fictitious suit like our common recovery;
or by tradition, which answered pretty nearly to a delivery with
us,' but which was applicable only to one kind of property, the res
nee mancipi, comprehending money and certain moveables. With
regard to incorporeal rights, as debts and the like, it was, until the
time of Justinian, a principle, that a voluntary promise, though
available by way of exception, gave rise to no action, unless made
in the form of a stipulatio, which was a symbolic proceeding, to
which the presence of several witnesses was also necessary. A,
valid promise, however, it seems, be created without consideration
when set down in the family registry, or in after times when tran-
scribed in the books of the Argentarii, the Roman Bankers, which
were received as the highest authority in Courts of Justice.2  As
to the assignment or cession of debts, it is sufficient to say, that at
the period of which we are speaking, such assignment gave, as in
our law, only the right to sue in the assignor's name, and then only
when nominated in a very particular manner.3  The regulations
thus fixed by the lex 'ncia, are supposed to have undergone
changes, of which, however, we have no authentic information,4
until we come to the time. of Constantine, who in 316 A. D., pro-
mulgated an edict, in the opinion of some rather in the nature of
instructions to a public officer, than a formal constitution, which
required to give validity to donations, an act in writing before
witnesses, containing the names of the parties and a description of
the thing, to which registration was to be added.5 These provisions
Owing to the peculiar theory of the Roman lawyers on the subject of possession,
it is not always safe to apply their rules as to the traditio requisite to transfer pro.
perty in a thing, to cases in the common law. The whole doctrine is investigated
by Savigny in a learned treatise, recently translated by Sir Erskine Perry, which
was quoted and commented on with much approbation in Bridges v. Hawkesworth,
7 Eng. Law and Eq. Rep. 434. See 19 Am. Jur. 13.
2 Savigny ut supra; Smith Dict. Antiq. sub verb Argentarii. The articles in the
latter work on the Roman law by Prof. Long, are by far the best and clearest expo-
sition of the system in the English language.
3 Mackeldey, 369. Walter, Proceed. Rom. ch. 12. 4 Savigny, J 165.
6 Insiniatio, may be thus translated for want of a better word. But it did not in
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do not appear to have been absolutely binding in all cases, but only
precautionary in their character. Subsequent constitutions dis-
pensed with writing and witnesses, where there was registration.'
With Justinian, however, an entirely new epoch in the law of gifts
was begun. In the first place, he provided that all gifts amounting
in value to more than 500 solidi, or about $1250, should be regis-
tered; those below following the ordinary course of transfer. In
neither of the cases, however, was writing made necessary. The
next and most material change was in authorizing an action
on a simple promise of donation, so that as in a sale, to which it
was expressly assimilated, delivery was not essential.2 As also the
contract of sale was merely consensual, requiring neither writing,
nor witnesses, no especial formalities were any longer required,
except registration when above the sum fixed.
While the ancient strictness with which the donation was hedged
in, was thus relaxed, it is not, however, to be supposed that the
donor was left without protection from the cons.equences of heedless
generosity, or from the ingratitude of his beneficiary. What had
been taken from the formalities of its creation, was fully compen-
sated for in the alterations introduced in its character. Before
absolute, it now became revocable; not indeed at pleasure, but
under fixed rules.' A donation once made, whether perfected by
delivery, or yet remaining in promise, may now be annulled either
by third persons, as children whose share in the estate has been
unlawfully diminished thereby, or creditors; or by the donor him-
self. In the latter case the revocation is allowed on the subsequent
birth of children, for the ungrateful or criminal conduct of the
beneficiary, or when the donor suffers afterwards any considerable
loss in his fortune.
4
itself require writing, being merely a note of the deolarations of the parties, taken
down by a magistrate, and deposited in actis curic. 1 Savig. by Cathcart, 91.
This constitution is to be found with some variations in Gaius, the Codex Theodos
and as the 25th Const. Code VIII. 54.
1 Const. 29, 81, Code VIII 54.
2 Const. 34-37, Code VIII. 54. See 2, Instit. II. 7. 3 Savigny, 168, &o.
4 Savigny, 168, &c.
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As may be gathered from. what has gone before, the subjects of
a donation, since the time of Justinian, comprehend all property
corporeal, or incorporeal. A voluntary promise is valid, and debts
may be created, transferred, or released without consideration.'
, We now come directly to the donatio morti8 cau8sa, which as
Savigny says, "is always comprised as a species within the defini-
tion of a donation," though subjected by legislation to the rules
-which govern legacies. 2  Three kinds are enumerated in the Digest s
which prove, that though usually 'made in the presence of some
immediate danger, and under that was comprehended even a de-
parture on a journey,4 yet the condition of the gift might be also
death viewed merely as the natural termination of life, 8o14 cogni-
tione mortalitatiB, which last Mackeldey considers as the true
donatio mortis causa.1 In every case, however, the donor reserved
to himself, tacitly, the right of revocation. 6
'Savigny, 155, &c. The modern law 'on the continent and in Louisiana is to
the same effect. Mouton v. Noble, 1 Louis. Ann. Rep. 194. See as to the mis-
application by English lawyers of the maxim ez nudo pacto non oritur actio, 10 Law
Rev. 56.
'System, 170.
'Fragm. 2, D. XXXIX 6, This passage is to be found verbatim in Bracton. It
was quoted in the leading case of Ward v. Turner, 2 Yes. 431; and has been too
frequently repeated to need particularization here. Lord Hardwicke, in the case
cited, has made an odd mistake as to the meaning of the sentence "mortis cansa
donatur, quod prmesens prissenti dat," occurring in the 88th fragment of the same
book and title of the Digest, which he says requires, ",that both donor and donee-
should be present at the time." Praosens, besides its general meaning, is used par-
ticularly in the law, (as opposed to in diem) in the sense of ",immediately, at
once," (Freund Lex. sub verb,) which signification it has in the passage of which
.he speaks, where the donatio mortis causa is contradistinguished from cases of the
mortis causa capio, in which, as a direction in a will to the heir to pay a sum to an
intended donee, the gift does not come into existence, so to speak, till after the
death of the donor. That the bodilyprezence of the donee is immaterial, is obvious
rm 2, fragm. 18, of the same title, which, as well as fragm. 28, shows that con-
trary to Lord Hardwicke's inference from the passages he cites, the delivery of the
written evidences of a debt was sufficient. 4 FT. 3, Id.
6 Lehrb. 738, 2. Mr. Roper, M1r. Williams, (ut 8urpra,) and Lord Rosslyn (2
Yes. p. 119,) erroneously assert this, and the second species enumerated in the
Digest, to be merely gifts inter vivos. But the institute (B. II, tit. 7) on which they
rely, really wrought no change in this respect, as may be seen by the contemporary
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The usual mode of perfecting this species of gift, was as in other
cases, by the transfer of the property, which was at first by manci-
pation, without delivery; in later times, by tradition. The property
either vested at once in the donee, subject to be divested on the
survivor or recovery of the donor; which was the usual, and
implied condition; or else did not pass till the latter's death, which
was a special case, and needed to be expressed. Where there was
no actual transmission of property, a stipulation, or under Justinian
a simple promise, was an efficient mode of gift, but as the donor
had always the power of revocation, it could be enforced only as
against his heirs. Such a promise would of course render delivery
unnecessary.'
So far of the donatio inortis causa, treated as a gift. But as
its objects were obviously testamentary, it was long a question
among jurisconsults how far the rules which governed legacies
should be applied to it. Justinian cut the knot, by expressly sub-
jecting it to most of those rules; he at the same time allowed it in
all cases to be proved by five witnesses, as in the case of a legacy.2
There has been some difference of opinion among the modern
writers on this last point, but the reasoning of Savigney and others
appears conclusive that the edict was not restrictive, and that the
proof by five witnesses was only necessary where, from want of
registry, or for other causes the gift could not operate inter vivos.3
Below the sum of 500 solidi, before mentioned, no particular form,
therefore, was essential.
From this hasty sketch of the provisions of the Roman Law on
the subject of our inquiry, we may discover in them the following
marked characteristics: 1. The gift causa nortis was the means
of transferring every species of property, whether in possession
or in action, and with or without delivery. 2. Fraud or prodi-
commentary of Theophilus thereon. See also Vinnius on the passage. Lord
Rosslyn in the case cited, corrects, quite sarcastically, Swinbourne, a writer whom
he might :have supposed acquainted with the Civil law; but is himself entirely
wrong.
6 See Mackeldey, 758, &c. I Savigney, ut supr.
2 Novel, 87, c. 1. Legacies and fidei commissa did not need to be written.
a Savigny, ut sup. 1fackeldey, 759.
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gality was guarded against, beyond certain limits at leastj by
means that obviously ensured certainty of proof. 3. These gifts
occupied a consistent position, with relation to the testamentary
system ; for legacies, as we observed, did not need to be in writing,
and any other differences were expressly abolished.1
So far we have been pursuing the natural development of well
understood principles, but when we turn to the common law for
the purpose of comparing with its doctrines, the results at which
we have arrived, we find ourselves, since the gift in view of death
is not indigenous in England, upon less certain ground.
Before the Statute of Frauds no particular formalities were re-
quired to constitute a good bequest of personality, except, if Brac-
ton and .Swinburne be correct, two or more witnesses. Devises of
lands, however, until the statute of 34 Henry VIII., were invalid, ex-
cept in certain cities and boroughs, which probably retain the Saxon
Law, where a disposition in lecto mortali was permitted.2  There
could therefore have been then no noticeable differences between
gifts mortis causa, and other testamentary dispositions, among
which they are, indeed, ranked by Bracton and Fleta, who describe
them in the terms of the Roman law. After, however, the statute
of Charles was passed, it was found that notwithstanding the care
with which it was framed, it omitted to provide for cases where a
gift made by a dying man, was so far perfected by delivery as to be
good inter vivos, while its purpose was legatory. From a decision
mentioned by, Mr. Swinburne, and those cited by Lord Hardwicke
from the ecclesiastical court,3 the tendency appears to have been,
at first to treat such gifts as testamentary. This also would seem
to have been somewhat the inclination of Lord Cowper.4 It is to
I In the principal civil law countries, at the present time, as France and Louisiana
the donatio mortis causa is only valid as a will.
2 Swinbourne. Abbreviatio Placitarum, 56 Hen. 3, rot. 21, p. 180. Livery of
seizen was however necessary. (Abbr. Plact. Ed. 1, p. 272, rot 17.) The course
is said in an old case to have been to prove the will before the ordinary, and then
the Mayor of the town made livery. (Id. p. 284; 19 Ed. 1, rot. 51.)
In an instance mentioned in the introduction to Kemble's Codex Diplom. Sax., a
Saxon matron disposes all her property by parol will.
3 Swinburne B. 1, sect. 7. Ward v. Turner, 2 Ves.
4 Hedges v. Hedges, Prec. Ch., 269.
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be regretted that in a matter so much within the spirit of the
statute, this extreme had not rather been followed, at least where
the object was clearly legative. But Courts of Equity had found
ready to their hand, in the Roman Law, a head corresponding to
their purpose, and with rules extending to such a variety of cases,
that they were content to adopt them, without caring to-crutinize
too closely the principles upon which they were founded. But it is
easy for us to perceive the error into which they fell, when we place
alongside of what have been just stated to be the distinguishing
marks of the civil law, the correspondent doctrines of our own.
To take the first point in order, it is needless to observe that at
common law a gift without delivery is void. So, too, from the
earliest period it has been the doctrine of Equity, that the Court
would never interfere to perfect a voluntary disposition; nor as it
has been repeatedly ruled, would it enforce against the executor,
what it could not enforce against the party, unless the legal title
has passed from the latter in his lifetime.1
In the next place, as to the precautions against fraud, it is only
necessary so say, that as neither writing nor any particular number
of witnesses is required, a fortune might be transferred in this way
in bonds, mortgages, notes, or the like, with nothing to authenticate
the gift, but such evidence, as unfortunately, in any large city may
be had for the asking.
Finally, instead of being a part of a harmonious system, as we
observed it in the civil law, the gift .in view of death is anomalous
and exceptional. The same thing which, when called a legacy, is
guarded with the greatest strictness, when styled a donatio mortis
causa, is left to be established by such means as are most conve-
nient to the donee. The absurdity does not stop here. If the
donor instead of declaring the giftin words, puts it, out of greater
precaution, at the same time in writing,2 or if, which would be per-
IDuplege's case, in 1.5 Hen. 7, cited in Carry's Rep. 7. Antrobus v. Smith, 12
Yes. 47. Meek v. Kettlewell, 1 Hare, 464; 1 Phil. 342. Hughes v. Stubbs, 1 Hare,
476; McFadden v. Jenkins, 1 Hare, 458; Dillon v. Coppin, 4 Myl. & Cr., 647, &c.
&c.
2 Edwards v. Jones, 1 My. & Cr., 226.
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fectly good inter vivos,' instead of delivering the chattels he makes
a deed of gift to take effect on his death, it must be proved as a
will. 2  We might easily point out other inconsistencies, such as the
fact that a subsequent will does not work a revocation,3 the evasion
of the collateral inheritance tax, and the like; but we have already
drawn sufficiently upon our limits.
These radical and important points of difference then, between
the two systems of law, must satisfy any one, we think, of the pro-
priety of the strictures of the Supreme Court in the case which has
been the occasion of our remarks. They might indeed lead us into
a broader inquiry. Taking in view the salutary policy of the Sta-
tute of Wills, and the care with which modern legislation has
endeavoured -to guard against fraud and imposition under circum-
stances, when they can be most easily practised and least readily
detected, the propriety of making this whole matter the subject of
statutory regulation, very naturally suggests itself. The gift causa
mortis is, we have seen, anomalous in its character, and based upon
principles, the reverse of which obtain in the common law. The
practical inconveniences resulting from it, have moreover, led to the
abolition of its distinguishing peculiarities in those countries where
a deference to the Roman Law might be supposed to have retained
it the longest. It has been the fruitful source of litigation, of those
contests which, with their recriminations of perjury and fraud have
embittered families, and disgraced society. It has, on the other
hand, nothing to recommend it, beyond what has already been pro-
vided for by the ordinary testamentary legislation; nor any conve-
nience to counterbalance the dangers by which it is accompanied.
IY. B. 7 Ed. 4, 20. Irons v. Smallpiece, 2 B. & Ald. 551. Lunn v. Thornton, 1
M. G. & S. 381. Butler & Baker's case, 8 Co. 26, (b.)
2 Powell on Dev. note; Ward v. Turner, 2 Ves. Sr. 431; Thorold v. Thorold, 1
Phillimore, 1; Atty. Gen. v. Jones, 3 Price; Dana v. Bank of Mobile, 2 Alab. 152;
Gage v. Gage, 21 N. H. 371; Jackson v. Culpepper, 2 Kelley, 594; Gilmore v.
Whiteside, Dudley Eq. 14; Watkins v. Dean, 18 Yerg. 321; Welsh v. Kinnaird,
Spear Ch. 256; Tailor v. Taylor, 2 Humph. 597; Lightfoot v. Colgin, 5 lumf. 42;
Morrell v. Dickey, 1 John. Ch. 153; Grattan v.,Appleton, 3 Story, 755; Heston v.
Young, 2 Kelly, 32.
3 Nicholas v. Adams, 2 Wh. 7.
